State of Utah v. Roberts Glen Brown : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
State of Utah v. Roberts Glen Brown : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.; Attorney for AppellantRobert B Hansen; Attorney for Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Brown, No. 15328 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/760
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF U'l'AH 
STATE OF UTAH / 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
ROBERT GLEN BROWN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPEAL FROM THi: 
JUDICIAL DI.MRI'C'l' C 
SALT LAKE COON'!'Y, !t, 
HONORABLE JAMI$~ S. , . 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
343 South Sixth 
Salt Lake City, 
Attorney for Appellant 
:. 
., 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE------------------ 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT--------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL------------------------------ 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS----------------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED 
EVIDENCE OF ANOTHER CRIMINAL ACT---------- 3 
CONCLUSION------------------------------------------- 7 
CASES CITED 
Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 
1956)------------------------------------- 5 
State v. Schieving, 535 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1975)-------- 7 
United States v. Beechum, 555 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 
1977)------------------------------------- 5,6 
United States v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 
1973)------------------------------------- 6 
United States v. Spica, 413 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 
1969)-----------------------~------------- 5 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-120 (1953), as amended--------- 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1953), as amended--------- 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1953), as amended--------- 1 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 55-----------~---------- 4,6,7 
-i-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
ROBERT GLEN BROWN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
15328 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with the crimes of theft 
by receiving, theft by deception, and selling a motor vehicle 
with an altered vehicle identification number in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408, 76-6-405, and 41-1-120 (1953), as 
amended. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by jury, the Honorable James s. 
Sawaya, District Judge, presiding. The jury returned a verdict 
of guilty as to all three counts, and the court placed appellant 
on probation on condition he serve six months in the county jail 
and make full restitution to the victim. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 14, 1976, a bronze and white, three-
quarter ton, 1974 Chevrolet pickup truck was stolen from 
Marvin J. Butler (T.8-9). On November 4, 1976, Jesse Labrum 
sold the appellant a wrecked 1974 half-ton Chevrolet pickup 
truck without cab, bed, or engine (T.22-25,32). As part of 
the sale, the witness Labrum delivered a certificate of title 
to the appellant bearing the name Robert Greene (T.34-35). 
The appellant sold Larry Lindsay a 1974 Chevrolet pickup 
truck (T.53-54). The appellant described the truck as a half· 
ton truck, but it was actually a three-quarter ton truck 
(T.67). As part of the sale, appellant delivered to Lindsay 
a certificate of title for a one-half ton pickup truck bearin~ 
the name of Robert Greene (T.55-56). On November 15, 1976, 
Marvin Butler observed a truck in the yard of the Lindsay 
home, and identified it as the truck stolen from him (T.9-10). 
The Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) had been ground off 
of the engine, and a plate bearing the VIN had been rem~~ 
from the left door frame (T.11-12). A fictitious, hand-sta~re 
I 
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VIN had been placed on the engine (T.80). Hal Vincent, a 
Special Agent of the National Automobile Theft Bureau, 
determined that the vehicle's original VIN identified 
the truck as the one stolen from Butler, and that the 
fictitious VIN stamped on the engine matched the VIN of 
the wrecked truck appellant had purchased from Labrum (T.80-
81, 86-87). At trial, the defense theory of the case was 
that the appellant was innocently involved with the criminal 
actions of his son (T.105). In rebuttal, the State presented 
evidence that appellant had purchased a wrecked 1976 Granada 
from Labrum (T.201). A 1976 Granada was stolen from Gunnar 
Mortensen (T.208). When the stolen car was recovered, it 
was determined that certain parts had been replaced from 
the wreck owned by the appellant so that it would appear 
that the stolen car's VIN was the VIN of the wrecked car 
owned by the appellant (T.212-213). It was also established 
that appellant had sold a 1976 Granada to his mother (T.135-
136). 
Appellant objected to the introduction of this 
evidence on rebuttal (T.200). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF 
ANOTHER CRIMINAL ACT. 
-3-
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 55, provides that 
evidence of the corrunission of a crime is admissible when 
relevant to prove intent, knowledge or absence of mistake 
or accident. In this case, appellant claims that his 
involvement with the stolen truck was wholly innocent, 
without guilty knowledge or criminal intent, and that his 
son was the true culprit. By raising this defense, appellant 
had clearly put into issue his own knowledge and intent, and 
evidence tending to prove the commission of another offense 
would therefore be properly admitted if it tended to prove 
criminal intent or knowledge. The criminal act with which 
appellant was charged is the theft of a truck, the sale of 
a stolen truck, and the attempt to conceal the crime by 
altering the VIN of the stolen truck to match that of a 
wrecked vehicle owned by the appellant. Evidence of an 
offense extrinsic to the offense charged was offered by the 
State that tended to establish the theft of a car, the 
sale of a stolen car, and an attempt to conceal the crime 
by replacing parts bearing VIN numbers on the stolen car 
with parts from a wrecked car purchased by the appellant. 
Both criminal acts (the charged offense and the extrinsic 
offense) reveal a strikingly similar modus operandi, and 
evidence that appellant was involved in one act is probatiff ! 
-4- l 
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of his criminal intent in the other. The evidence of the 
extrinsic offense was probative on a relevant issue and 
therefore admissible. 
The authority cited by appellant is readily 
distinguishable. Appellant has cited a group of federal 
circuit court cases for the proposition that a high standard 
of similarity must be met before evidence of extrinsic offenses 
can be admitted. Assuming that this high standard is applicable 
in this State, respondent submits that an examination of the 
facts in those cases shows that the standard has been met here. 
In United States 'v. Spica, 413 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1969), the 
court held that evidence that defendant cashed other stolen 
checks was admissible to prove that defendant transported a 
stolen check in interstate commerce. In United States v. 
Beechum, 555 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1977), the Court held that 
evidence that defendant possessed credit cards not in his 
own name was not sufficiently similar to the charged offense 
of stealing a silver dollar from the mails to be admissible. 
In Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1956), 
defendant was charged with fraud in the mail order of 
geraniums. The court held that an earlier transaction which 
occurred more than five years prior to the charged offense, 
where several customers complained that defendant was dilatory 
-5-
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in forwarding tulip bulbs and refunds, was not sufficiently 
related to the charged offense to be admissible. Finally, 
in United States v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1973), 
the court held that evidence that the defendant endorsed 
other securities was not sufficiently related to the charge 
of transporting forged securities to be admissible. The 
court intimated that if the government could prove encashrnent 
or passing of the other securities they would be admissib~. 
Broadway at 995. Judge Gee has observed that Broadway is the 
"most extreme" Fifth Circuit case imposing restrictions on the 
admission of extrinsic offense evidence. United States v. 
Beechum, supra at 509 (Gee, J. dissenting). A serious argu-
ment can be made that the Broadway "clear and convincing" 
standard is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Beechum at 514 (Gee, J. dissenting) • Assuming, however, that 
the Broadway standard is applicable to this case, respondent 
submits that the similarity between the charged offense and 
the extrinsic offense is clear and convincing, and evidence 
of the extrinsic evidence was properly admitted on rebuttal. 
Assuming that the clear and convincing standard 
had not been met in this case, respondent avers that ~ 
theshold requirements to the admission of extrinsic offense 
evidence is not the law of this jurisdiction. Rule 55 of the 
-6- 1 
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Utah Rules of Evidence contains no threshold requirements 
for admission of extrinsic offense evidence other than 
relevancy to a material fact. In State v. Schieving, 535 
P.2d 1233 (Utah 1975), this Court held that when a defendant 
has been charged with mishandling public money, evidence of 
other shortages within the defendant's department are 
admissible even though it has not been shown how those 
shortages occurred. In Schieving, this Court upheld the 
admission of evidence that the defendant had committed 
other crimes than the one charged when that evidence was 
relevant to prove a material fact without imposing further 
restrictions on the admissiblity of the evidence. Evidence 
that appellant was involved in the Granada transaction was 
probative of his claim that his involvement with the pickup 
was without criminal intent or guilty knowledge. Because 
evidence of the Granada offense was probative of a material 
fact, the evidence was properly admitted under Schieving, 
supra. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the court below did not 
err in admitting evidence of an offense other than the 
offense charged because the evidence was probative of a 
material fact. The charged offense and the extrinsic offense 
-7-
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were similar enough that the probative value outweighed any 
prejudice to the appellant. Appellant's conviction should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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